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CHAPTER 7 
PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION 
 
Introduction to Chapter 7 
In Chapter 4, drawing on Johnson’s (1996) generic polarity of ADoing/Being@ (p. 221), I identified 
both polarities of meaning (where the meanings are opposites) and polarities of function (where one 
polarity is the means by which the other polarity is achieved). Thus, I have presented freedom-
authority, diversity-equality, and human rights-communal obligations as polarities of meaning while I 
have labeled justice-due-process as a polarity of function. However, I believe the polarity of 
participation and representation represents a hybrid of a polarity of meaning and a polarity of function. 
In this respect, this polarity is unique among the five pairs of polarities that I include within the 
Polarities of Democracy. 
Specifically, when the participation-representation polarity is managed effectively, an upside of 
representation is to serve as a process whereby the individual’s ability to engage in participation is 
strengthened and/or regenerated. In this case, representation serves as a polarity of function, a means 
by which participation is achieved. Yet in some cases, in order to fulfill its role as a polarity of 
function, representation will be found to be the opposite of participation, whereby it will allow for an 
individual’s disengagement from the participatory process, thereby providing the individual the needed 
time for regeneration of participatory inclination and ability. In this circumstance, while remaining a 
polarity of function, representation also takes on a polarity of meaning.  
Thus, in Section 1 of this chapter I explore the characteristics, upsides, and downsides of 
participation and representation as the fifth and final pair of polarities within the Polarities of 
Democracy model. Then, in Section 2, I first use the questions that I drew from Johnson (1996) in 
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Chapter 2 to examine a) whether or not a polarity relationship exists for participation and 
representation, and b) if so, the extent to which the polarity conforms to the expectations of Johnson’s 
model. I then examine the interrelationship of participation and representation with the other elements 
of the Polarities of Democracy model. 
Section 1. The Characteristics, Upsides, and Downsides of 
Participation and Representation 
 
Participation vs. Representation 
In introducing the participation-representation polarity, I have presented representation as a 
polarity of function for participation, a necessary means to enable participation to flourish. In this 
view, participation is presented as an essential element of democratic theory, and certainly it is one of 
the elements most consistently identified in general and workplace democracy literature as an essential 
element of democracy. Yet, there are those who challenge this concept, and I address their concerns 
first. 
As I noted in Chapter 1, Young (2002) views representative forms of democracy as necessary not 
only for nations or large organizations, but also for neighborhoods and workplaces. At the same time, 
Young supports my position that participation is also necessary for the effective functioning of 
democracy. But there are theorists who elevate representation to a level wherein it becomes Athe 
distinctive feature of democracy@ as noted disdainfully by Pateman (1970, p. 4). Schumpeter (1943), 
Berelson (1952), and Dahl (1956) are among those advocating this point of view, in which democracy 
is thought of as only method and the concept that democracy serves as an ideal (such as my contention 
that the purpose of democracy is to overcome oppression) is rejected. 
Pateman (1970) tells us that, beginning with Schumpeter in 1943, an entire school of theorists 
emerged who have led a significant debate within the field of political science as to the role of 
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participation as an element of democracy. They have argued that participation (other than voting) 
should not play a significant role in the democratic process. This school of thought believes that the 
limitation on participation is necessary in order to ensure stability of the community. Their argument is 
that significant participation invites chaos because they believe that many (if not most) citizens do not 
have the capacity to participate on complex issues in an informed way. In this school of thought, 
participation is linked more with totalitarianism than democracy. Pateman (1970) reports that much of 
the thinking which informs this point of view arose from very real concerns: AThe collapse of the 
Weimar Republic, with its high rates of mass participation, into fascism, and the post-war 
establishment of totalitarian regimes based on mass participation, albeit participation backed by 
intimidation and coercion@ (p. 2). 
In Schumpeter’s (1943) view ADemocracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of 
institutional arrangement for arriving at political-legislative and administrative-decisions@ (p. 243). 
Thus, Pateman (1970) tells us that Schumpeter saw democracy as Aa theory unassociated with any 
particular ideals or ends@ (p. 3). Interestingly, as is discussed later in this chapter, Schumpeter’s view 
of democracy as a means without ends coincides precisely with that of Mason (1982), who, despite this 
similar starting point, comes to an opposite conclusion: that the only defining element of democracy is 
participation. 
Pateman (1970) labels the arguments of those in the anti-participation school as Athe contemporary 
theory of democracy@ (p. 13).  She also tells us that, despite the origins of their opposition to 
participation arising from their association of it with totalitarianism, at least one proponent of this 
school incongruently comes to the conclusion that a stable democracy requires a governmental pattern 
that has a Ahealthy element of authoritarianism@ (Eckstein, 1966, p. 262).  
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Within the contemporary school of thought, participation is viewed only as playing a limited roll; 
that is, of ensuring the protection of Athe private interests of each citizen@ (Pateman, 1970, p. 20). 
Pateman tells us that those supporting the contemporary theory of democratic participation base their 
position on the rejection of a supposed classical theory, without providing citations to back up their 
interpretation of this supposed classical theory. Pateman debunks the classical theory (as presented by 
the contemporaries) as a myth and provides citations to show that the classicists’ ideas were much 
deeper than how they are portrayed by the contemporaries. 
Pateman acknowledges that such classicists as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill did provide 
descriptions of participation that can reasonably be described as conforming to the protectionist views 
of participation expressed by Schumpeter and the other contemporaries. However, she finds that the 
reason for this is that AMill and Bentham are concerned almost entirely with the national ‘institutional 
arrangements’ of the political system@ (p. 19). Pateman tells us that within their construct: AThe 
participation of the people has a very narrow function; it ensures that good government, i.e. 
‘government in the universal interest’, is achieved through the sanction of loss of office.@   
Pateman (1970) goes on to point out that there are other classicists, such as Rousseau and John 
Stuart Mill, who provide a competing and more robust version of participation. She refers to these 
theorists as Atheorists of participatory democracy@ (p. 20). For these theorists, Aparticipation has far 
wider functions and is central to the establishment and maintenance of a democratic polity, the latter 
being regarded not just as a set of national representative institutions but what I shall call a 
participatory society.@   
Participation 
I turn now to my examination of participation as an essential element of the Polarities of 
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Democracy model wherein my view of participation is in juxtaposition with the contemporary theories 
of Schumpeter and is consistent with the work of Rousseau, J. S. Mill, and Pateman. I begin with my 
assertion that participation is a human right and go on to explore upsides associated with three 
interrelated functions that participation serves, particularly in terms of workplace democracy: a) 
providing worker control of decision-making; b) providing a learning process; and c) impacting human 
development. In this examination, I am describing participatory systems in which workers have 
meaningful and effective participation. This should not be confused with pseudo-participatory systems 
(described by Bernstein, 1976; Verba, 1961; Selener, 1997, among others) in which organizations seek 
only to create the perception that workers are participating, while real decision-making power remains 
in the hands of management. 
Participation as a Human Right 
While I have specified Human Rights as one of the elements of the Polarities of Democracy 
model, each of the other elements of the Polarities of Democracy (as I noted in Chapter 6) entails both 
rights and obligations, but they are separated out because of two factors: a) their prominence within the 
literature; or b) both rights and obligations accrue to each side of the specific polarity. For example, 
while participation certainly should be viewed as a human right that must be guaranteed, Bernstein 
(1976) nevertheless sets it apart as a separate element of his model of workplace democratization. As I 
do with the Polarities of Democracy, Bernstein presents worker participation as such a major element 
of workplace democratization that it must have its own place in addition to the general category of 
human rights. Also providing support for the concept of participation as a human right is the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Article 23 (4) states AEveryone has the right to form and to join 
trade unions for the protection of his [sic] interests@ (p. 5). This certainly implies that worker 
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participation is indeed a human right. 
Pateman (1970) explores the ways in which participatory theorists view participation as essential 
for humans exercising control over their own lives and their world. Thus, if participation is essential 
for attaining control over our lives, and if one of the purposes of democracy is to allow people 
(particularly workers) to gain control over their lives, then participation that enables worker control 
can be seen as an essential element of workplace democracy and as a human right.  
Melman (2001) provides more specificity to the concept of worker control by presenting worker 
participation in decision making as a human right. Thus, Melman asserts that decisions about 
technology must be made in the interests of the workers and the community (i.e., organizations have 
obligations to both workers and to the community). Melman believes that these obligations stem from 
the reality that production is a necessary condition to ensure survival of both individuals and society. 
Most significantly, Melman argues that workers have a right to participate in decision-making through 
workplace democracy because the failure to do so ensures the continued Ainattention to occupational 
illness@ (p. 404) such as the devastating problems afflicting workers in the US through the Aepidemic of 
repetitive strain injuries.@ 
Ellerman (1990) also concurs that worker participation in decision-making is a human right. He 
states: ADecision-making capacity is de facto inalienable. A person cannot in fact alienate his or her 
decision-making capacity....’Deciding to do as one is told’ is only another way of deciding what to do@ 
(p. 65). Poole (1975) adds that worker participation is: Athe most appropriate solution to the problems 
of alienation in modern industrial societies@ (p. 3). Similarly, Melman (2001) views participation in 
decision-making as an inalienable right that lies at the heart of the struggle for workplace democracy. 
Melman states AAs I argue throughout this study, workers have struggled constantly to create and 
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operate an alternative, a disalienated form of decision-making that is at the core of workplace 
democracy@ (p. 13). Melman goes on to place this struggle in an historical context:  
The installation of the employment relation introduced new rules for the decision-making and 
producing occupations, and defined much of the change from feudalism to capitalism. So, too, the 
introduction of worker decision-making as the guiding principle of production will be the crucial 
element in a transformation from capitalism to workplace democracy. (p. 393) 
Starting from this premise of worker participation in decision-making as a human right, I now 
examine the upsides and downsides of participation. As will be seen throughout this section, the 
upsides of participation accrue to both the individual worker and the organization (or the community) 
as a whole. 
Participation: Providing Worker Control of Decision-Making 
One of the earliest researchers in the area of workplace democracy, Bernstein (1976) defines 
participation as worker control; specifically Ameaningful participation in decision-making is 
consistently available to each member (at least within his [sic] area of competence and concern)@ (p. 
9). Further support for the concept of participation as worker control comes from Karasek and 
Theorell’s (1990) Demand-Control model that demonstrates the extent to which workers require 
control over their jobs in order to reduce occupational stress. Shapiro (1999) adds that those who have 
the most at stake have the greatest claim to the right to participation. Consequently, he recognizes that 
one of the most significant challenges for participation is to Acome up with decision rules that can 
reconcile the purposes of different activities with the best possible democratic control of the power 
relations that structure them@ (p. 237). 
Thus, the challenge becomes ensuring that participation achieves worker control of the decision-
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making process. As noted above, Mason (1982) defines workplace democracy solely in terms of 
participation (contrary to my position). He ascribes no other values to democracy, other than to the 
extent that they promote participation. He believes that the term democracy has been greatly 
misunderstood and appropriated by many theorists who are patently un-democratic. He believes that no 
nation has attained the democratic ideal; thus he finds that, as noted in Chapter 1, Ademocracy cannot 
be viewed as synonymous with any nation, nor can any nation serve as a normative standard against 
which others are judged@ (p. 28). He adds that worker participation must be Awidespread and effective@ 
(p. 26) particularly as it relates to decision making. Mason further defines Awidespread and effective@ 
by stipulating five dimensions of participation: Aextensity, scope, mode, intensity, and quality@ (p. 
154). But this brings up the contradiction in Mason’s position. Since Mason has limited workplace 
democracy only to the concept of participation, and since effective participation in decision making is 
only possible with equality of access to information by all, it appears that his concept of democracy 
must embrace other elements such as equality. 
Similarly, Karasek and Theorell (1990) join Mason (1982) in defining workplace participation as 
effective and meaningful participation in the decision making process. However, they also somewhat 
confuse the issue by both distancing themselves from workplace democracy (as described in Chapter 
1) while equating participation in the decision making process with worker control, a concept that 
appears to require all of the elements contained within the Polarities of Democracy model. In this vein, 
they point out that (as noted elsewhere) AThe primary work-related risk factor [for occupational stress] 
appears to be lack of control over how one meets the job’s demands and how one uses one’s skills@ (p. 
9). They go on to show that: AIn many cases, elevation of risk with a demanding job appears only when 
these demands occur in interaction with low control on the job.@  Yet they do not address all of the 
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other elements within the Polarities of Democracy, each of which appears to be related to the issue of 
worker control (e.g., my freedom-authority polarity, the effective management of which addresses 
imbalances of power within the workplace - a factor that significantly impacts the issue of meaningful 
worker control). 
Expanding on the meaning of effective participation in decision-making, Blake and Mouton 
(1987) describe it as decisions that result in Aunderstanding and agreement@ (p. 89). In their definition, 
decision-making is seen as reaching the soundest outcome rather than reaching the outcome desired by 
whoever has the most power. Yet they do not suggest a mechanism (other than employer good will) 
through which disparate levels of power may be controlled. 
Melman (2001) does offer such a mechanism and provides further elaboration on the concept of 
effective participation in decision making. Reporting on the APartnership Agreement@ (p. 296) forged 
by the Harley-Davidson Motorcycle Company and its unions, Melman finds that: Athe most striking 
feature of the agreement is its emphasis on the importance of consensus decision-making.@  He further 
notes that AAgreement on the use of consensus method by management and union bears upon every 
aspect of worker and management decision-making, for it constitutes a recognition of the union as a 
co-equal power.@  Interestingly, consensus decision-making is an essential element of Blake and 
Mouton’s (1987) collaborative leadership style. The difference is that with Blake and Mouton, 
implementation of the consensus decision-making process remains a prerogative of management that 
can always be taken away. The contractual partnership reported on by Melman overcomes the 
disparate power of management versus worker by creating a contractual obligation that must be 
fulfilled. 
But if participation means worker control of the decision-making process, then there are 
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significant upsides not just for the workers but for the organizations as well. Among the upsides of 
participation in decision-making, Mason (1982) sees the development of better decisions and notes that 
this has been recognized as far back as Aristotle. However, Mason continues to ignore the importance 
of other elements of a democratic system which go into making participation in decision making an 
equitable process, in which all voices are heard and decisions are reached on the basis of the soundest 
arguments, not who has the most power. Mason avoids considering that other elements are necessary 
for democracy by providing the generalization that participation must be widespread and effective. But 
(as noted above) other essential elements of democracy (e.g. diversity-equality, freedom-authority) are 
required to enable participation to be widespread and effective. 
Melman (2001) explores extensive research that lends support to the idea that one of the upsides of 
worker participation in decision-making is that it leads to better decisions, and thus, to Aincreased 
productivity@ (p. 250). In several studies of companies engaged in production, Melman reports that:  
What is striking is that the nature of the operations performed is unaltered, as is the design of the 
machines. What is changed is the maintenance attention given by the production workers to the 
operation of machines, the care given to the adjustment of the machines and worker attention to 
uncovering and correcting sources of possible defects. (p. 425) 
Schweickart (2002) joins in reporting on the extensive research linking worker participation in 
decision making with increased productivity. He goes on to add that: Aparticipation is most conducive 
to enhancing productivity when combined with profit sharing [consistent with the findings of 
Bernstein, 1976], guaranteed long-range employment, relatively narrow wage differentials, and 
guaranteed worker rights (such as protection from dismissal except for just cause)@ (p. 60). 
Providing further support for the idea that worker participation in decision-making benefits both 
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the worker and the organization, Karasek and Theorell (1990) examine job redesign among health care 
workers and report that: Aincreasing the participatory decision-making responsibilities of lower-level 
staff workers increased their morale substantially and promoted more individualized patterns of patient 
care which, again, increase the patients’ own capabilities to manage their illness@ (p. 198). This leads 
Karasek and Theroell to Arecommend changes like this [increasing worker participation in decision-
making] as a strategy to reduce the conventional economic costs of health care--a strategy that could 
both improve output (patient health) and improve the well-being of health care professionals.@ Karasek 
and Theroell thus conclude that worker participation in decision-making benefits the organization 
because: Aworkers have essential information about the actual operation of the system that may never 
be reflected in the aggregated and structured data bases reviewed by management. This information is 
vital to productivity@ (p. 275). 
An additional upside for the organization from worker participation in decision-making is 
presented by Pateman (1970). She notes the increased extent to which Aindividuals will conscientiously 
accept@ (p. 27) decisions that have been Aarrived at through a participatory decision-making process.@  
The extent to which such a participatory decision-making process can contribute to both worker 
satisfaction and organizational excellence also has been extensively articulated by Blake and Mouton 
(1987). 
Finally, Karasek and Theorell (1990) believe that an additional upside of participation (when 
defined as worker control of the decision-making process) may be to: Aoffset the negative impact of the 
job change process itself, often to a significant degree. Thus, if an inevitable stressor in modern society 
is industrial change, then an effective antidote may be participation in decision making at the 
workplace@ (p. 186). 
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Participation as an Educational Process 
Pateman (1970) notes that the participation of individual citizens in decision making Ahas a 
psychological effect on the participants, ensuring that there is a continuing interrelationship between 
the working of institutions and the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals interacting 
within them@ (p. 22). Thus, Pateman believes it is the educative function of participation itself that 
gives the individual the capacity for further participation. This educative function extends to learning 
the ways in which public and private interests are linked. 
Further, the concerns raised by Schumpeter and the other contemporary school advocates 
regarding the supposed incompetence of most people can be addressed by the use of participation as an 
experiential educational methodology. The extent to which there actually is a downside of participation 
brought about by the involvement of unqualified individuals in the decision making process is best 
addressed not by excluding those individuals from that process but by improving their abilities through 
successful practice of the participatory process. Indeed, Almond and Verba’s (1963) research supports 
the idea that participatory democratic experiences in non-governmental settings (such as the 
workplace) contribute to a sense of political competence in the societal democracy realm. Likewise, 
Poole (1975) states that worker participation in the decision making process is Athe best method of 
facilitating the development of socially aware and public-spirited people@ (p. 3).  
Thus, developing adult education practices that can improve the capacity of workers to participate 
effectively in the decision making process (as I return to in Chapter 8) can play a significant role in 
preparing workers for participation within society. However, as Blake and Mouton (1987) have 
demonstrated, while providing such individual skill development is essential for enabling workers to 
effectively participate, it is not sufficient. Also required are adult education practices that have the 
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capacity to address the barriers of organizational structure and processes. For this purpose, Blake and 
Mouton provide exemplary methods that can lead to behavioral changes on the part of those who hold 
the power that can thwart meaningful participation and instead provide only the token experiences of 
pseudo-participation. Yet, even these adult education practices may prove insufficient if those who 
hold the power choose not to pursue such opportunities. Once again, adult education practices applied 
to social movement efforts become essential in order to work towards the structural changes that are 
required to ensure legitimate opportunities for participation; so that even those who are otherwise 
unwilling to create meaningful opportunities for participation find that they are required to provide 
such processes.  
Mason (1982) also believes that active participation in one realm contributes to active 
participation in other realms. Further, he argues that participation in workplace decision making offers 
the best practice for participation in the governmental process because the workplace most closely 
approximates the political realm, in terms of the five dimensions of participation spelled out by Mason 
(i.e., extensity, scope, mode, intensity, and quality). This leads Mason to conclude that Adevolving 
decision making to the lowest level at which issues can be resolved@ (p. 165) is essential if workers are 
to become effective not only in societal democracy, but also in workplace democracy at the higher 
levels of the organization. Further, Mason believes that AThrough the experience of participation in the 
workplace, the least participatory members of our society will receive training in participation, training 
they do not receive elsewhere@ (p. 193). To the extent that this happens, workplace democracy can be a 
powerful tool for generating societal participation among those who, as Mason notes, can: Asend a 
message to government different from the one it is accustomed to hearing.@  However, Mason fails to 
account for the problem that those members of society who are the least participative in government 
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may be the most likely to be unemployed and therefore the least likely to benefit from increased 
worker participation.  
Adding to the concept that practice in participation at the workplace prepares workers to be 
participants in societal democracy, Lewis (1986) tells us that Ait is the direct participation of people in 
guiding their own immediate affairs [in the workplace] which gives them the competence to control 
and judge their representatives’ actions@ (p. 5). 
Karasek and Theorell (1990) point out that their research indicates that participation in the 
decision making process is an essential ingredient in the learning process. For example, they state: AIn 
our model, learning occurs in situations that require both individual psychological energy expenditure 
(demands or challenges) and...decision-making capability. As the individual...chooses how best to cope 
with a new stressor, that new behavior...will be learned@ (p. 92). Karasek and Theorell (1990) not only 
note the importance of workplace participation as a predictor of societal participation, they also ask: 
AAnd what about consumers whose leisure is too passive to require consumption of the products of our 
modern economy? Passive jobs may simply not support an active economy@ (p. 54), thus further 
highlighting the benefits of worker participation not only for the workers but also for the organization 
and society as a whole. 
However, Pateman (1970) links the learning properties of participation with worker control of 
decision making. She reminds us that an:  
Individual’s (politically relevant) attitudes will depend to a large extent on the authority 
structure of his [sic] work environment...Specifically, the development of a sense of political 
efficacy does appear to depend on whether his [sic] work situation allows him [sic] any scope 
to participate in decision making.@  (p. 53)  
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Participation and Human Development 
I next examine the relationship between participation and human development. I approach this 
examination from three perspectives: a) participation’s relationship to development of the individual; 
b) participation’s relationship to development of the community; and c) participation’s relationship to 
development of the human species. 
Karasek and Theorell (1990) point out that the findings from the research on workplace 
democratization conducted in Scandinavia may Aindicate an important mechanism by which more 
control [participation in decision-making] at work may reduce job stress: increased worker self-
confidence and self-esteem@ (p. 255). This increase in worker self-confidence and self-esteem should 
support the workers’ embracing of freedom as specified by Fromm (1941/1965). While the primary 
upside of this relationship is of benefit to the individual worker, both the organization and society 
should benefit from: a) the reduced costs of treatment stemming from the decreasing rate of 
occupational stress; and b) the increased productivity that should accompany that reduction in 
occupational stress. 
Poole (1975) believes that participation in decision-making can serve Aas a means of overcoming 
major social disadvantages which are consequent upon non-democratic modes of decision-making@ (p. 
3). Again, the primary beneficiary of this relationship is the individual, yet there is also a benefit for 
the organization and society (e.g., increased productivity, increased buying power, decreased crime). 
Another upside of participation, noted by many including Maslow (1954), Aristotle (1961), and 
Rawls (1971/1999), is that it generates a desire within the individual to seek higher levels of 
involvement. Rawls has labeled this Athe Aristotelian Principle@ (p. 377) and tells us that Awhenever a 
person engages in an activity belonging to some [hierarchical] chain...he [sic] tends to move up the 
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chain. In general, he  [sic] will prefer doing the nth to doing the n-1th activity.@  In a related vein, Poole 
(1975) sees worker participation serving as Aa stepping-stone to the fulfillment of certain ‘higher 
echelons’ of needs which are deemed to be common to all men [sic]@ (p. 3). 
In terms of community development, Pateman (1970) postulates that participation serves as an 
Aintegrative function;...it increases the feeling among individual citizens that they ‘belong’ in their 
community@ (p. 27). Again, Blake and Mouton (1987) have provided extensive research demonstrating 
that this increased feeling of being part of a community applies to the workplace, where a genuine 
participatory decision-making process generates increased worker commitment to the organization. 
Mason (1982), drawing on Rousseau and John Stuart Mill, joins in the idea that participation serves to 
establish and strengthen the sense of community. Yet, once again, Mason’s own views are 
contradictory to his argument that participation, regardless of the outcome, is the only test of 
democracy. Unless the individual’s commitment to the common good is seen as an essential element of 
democracy (as in the Polarities of Democracy model) why does Mason believe that helping to develop 
that commitment should be considered an upside of participation? While Mason states that 
participation is the only defining element of democracy, all of his arguments articulate a vision of 
democracy that is broader than mere participation. In all cases, the good effects that Mason attributes 
to participation appear to be consistent with the presence of some other essential element of 
democracy. 
Karasek and Theorell (1990) find a further upside to participation in terms of the social interaction 
that it generates. Their research reveals that group interaction has a positive effect on both the 
individual and the work environment. For example, they state AAs work conditions...are reported to 
employers not by individuals but rather by groups of individuals, people lose their fear of self-
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deficiency and begin to develop a vocabulary to articulate the causes of their work-related problems@ 
(p. 210). Unfortunately, Karasek and Theorell also note that such workplace participation is not the 
norm within the US culture. Rather, they find that such jobs as: Aassemblers and machine operatives... 
keypunch operators and telephone operators...more clearly than any other [jobs] represent the 
automated, machine-paced worker on the assembly line; they embody Taylor’s job design principles@ 
(p. 74). Karasek and Theorell label these workers the Aisolated prisoner@ and report that: AThis 
combination of psychological characteristics appears to have no clear analogue in most animal 
societies and there is evidence that such jobs represent a clear sociobiological misfit with human 
physiological capabilities.@  
This difference between the human species and other animals leads to the more general question 
of the relationship of participation to the evolution of the human species. Mason (1982) views effective 
participation as human action that is purposeful and linked to the realization of human potential. In this 
sense his view is consistent with my view of human agency contributing to the positive evolution of 
the human species. Also consistent with my assumptions as specified in Chapter 1, Mason (1982) sees 
the elements associated with democracy stemming from both our selfish and altruistic tendencies. 
Once again, however, his view of democracy appears to be more consistent with a broader concept of 
democracy than with the value-free notion of participation that he ostensibly supports. For example, he 
presents his view of participatory democracy as having:  
A different view of man’s [sic] nature; liberal democracy [as articulated by Locke] depicts man 
[sic] largely as self-interested, acquiring, and manipulative; participatory democracy views man 
[sic] in a much more favorable light, stressing his [sic] ability to conceive of and maintain 
communities through his [sic] sincere empathy with other people. It conceives of the proper set 
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of institutions differently; liberal democracy seeks to fashion governmental institutions into a 
representative form and allow other institutions to favor the free acquisition of property; 
participatory democracy departs from the simple utilitarian view of institutions and 
communities and seeks to open them full to popular participation. Finally, it differs as to the 
proper view of the good life. Liberal democracy stresses acquiring almost exclusively 
individualistic values; participatory democracy in addition stresses the value of life shared in 
common with others. (p. 56) 
O’Manique (2003) goes even farther. For him, participation is an essential element in the survival 
of our species. He specifies participation as human agency, which he argues is responsible for the 
formation of our human cultures which, through human consciousness, now provide the ability to 
control our evolutionary process. Yet, O’Manique recognizes that participation, in the form of human 
agency, can only contribute to our human development if our actions are based on sound information 
and an understanding of Athe origins from which we have evolved@ (p. 111), thus drawing on both the 
decision-making and learning process relationships of participation.    
 
 
The Downsides of Participation 
One of the most significant downsides of participation is the possibility that the individual can 
become overwhelmed, worn-out, and ultimately disengaged and apathetic. For example, Mason (1982) 
states that one of the downsides of participation is that it can overwhelm the individual by being all-
consuming. He acknowledges that Athe purest imaginable democracy is no more desirable than it is 
possible@ (p. 30). But, because Mason equates democracy only with participation, he offers no way to 
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specify the appropriate level of participation. In contrast, viewing participation and representation as 
polarities offers us a way to seek the upsides of each while eliminating the downsides. 
Karasek and Theorell (1990) note that there can be potential downsides of worker participation in 
decisions about work procedures, if those workers do not have either the opportunity for interaction 
with other workers or some activity that would provide a regenerative polarity. Karasek and Theorell 
report that the AU.S. version of just-in-time assembly production is not really a participative, team 
approach@ (p. 266). Rather, they tell us it is one in which AAll parts of the system are pushed to peak 
performance.@  So, Karasek and Theorell find that AWhile workers...have power to alter work routines 
in cooperative conferences, they must adhere to these adopted procedures rigidly.@  Therfore, Karasek 
and Theorell conclude that Awhile these jobs would appear to be enriched and ‘active’ they are instead 
reported as stressful...new job designs where tasks have been packed in, with no opportunity for rest 
breaks.@  
Bernstein’s (1976) research also supports the idea that there can be a downside to Aover-
participation@ (p. 61). He found that even among the firms that he researched in which advanced 
democratization had occurred, they realized that when workers became involved in every decision, no 
matter how consequential, it had Ataken up too much of their time...[and] was also reducing their 
decision-making, as a firm, below optimum@. Shapiro (1999) concurs that participation can require so 
much time as to become unreasonable. 
Bernstein’s (1976) research finds that even in firms with advanced democratization (such as the 
plywood manufacturing cooperatives in the States of Oregon and Washington in the US) there are still 
varying levels of participation. He reports that they Aexhibit a gradation in participation and political 
maturity somewhat like that reported by political scientists for political democracies in general: a 
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proportion of activists, a proportion of ‘occasionals,’and a proportion of ‘apathetics’@ (p. 17). 
However, for these advanced cases of democratization, Bernstein reports that Athe ‘occasional’ and 
‘apathetic’ categories seem much smaller than what has been reported about national politics, and the 
active participants’ category seems significantly larger.@ 
Saul (1995) notes a downside of participation in such processes as referenda and direct 
democracy, which actually divert us from the real issues affecting our lives. He tells us that AThe 
modern referendum, as Napoleon understood when he invented it, is the ideal consummation of the 
rational as irrational, of the anti-democratic posing as democracy@ (p. 113). Saul goes on to say: Aboth 
the referendum and direct democracy are a happy marriage with corporatism. The complex, real 
questions are dealt with behind the scenes....As for the citizenry, they are occupied and distracted by 
the fireworks of their direct involvement.@ 
As noted above, while I believe that his responses are inappropriate, Schumpeter (1943) has 
identified very real downsides of participation. Certainly history teaches us that participation has the 
potential to take the form of violence and mob behavior. 
Finally, Fromm (1941/1965) finds a downside of participation in the: Atrait which became so 
prominent in Calvinism; the development of frantic activity and a striving to do something@ (p. 111). 
Fromm states that: AActivity in this sense assumes a compulsory quality: the individual has to be active 
in order to overcome his [sic] feeling of doubt and powerlessness.@  
Representation 
In contrast to those theorists like Schumpeter (1943) who place representation as the key element 
of democracy while shunning participation, Barber (1984) describes those arguments that reject 
representation as an element of democracy. But Young (2002) provides ample arguments for 
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considering participation and representation as paired elements of democracy. She concludes that 
Arepresentation and participation are not alternatives in an inclusive cummunicative democracy, but 
require each@ (p. 132). 
Representation as Regeneration 
Perhaps the most significant upside of representation is that it can provide the regenerative process 
required to enable individuals to participate in the democratic process at the highest possible level. For 
example, regeneration is grounded in the workplace democracy literature as a scientific and 
physiological requirement for the human body to be able to perform at peak levels. While Karasek and 
Theorell (1990) admit that because of the scarcity of the literature their Ahypotheses in this area 
[regeneration and worker health in the workplace] must therefore be speculative@ (p. 107); they 
nevertheless assert: Athe importance of this activity [physical regeneration] is attested to by the sheer 
volume of cell regeneration that is known to occur.@    
Another upside of representation that arises from its regenerative aspects (to the extent that it 
addresses the downside of participation that may lead to exhaustion) is that it may allow for improved 
human interaction. Karasek and Theorell (1990) note the need for relaxed social interaction. In 
examining the failure of modern work environments to provide such opportunities, they observe:  
What seems to be missing in the modern world is relaxed affiliative behavior, such as the 
grooming activities displayed in other mammals. This difference, along with the discrepancy between 
demands and control, seems to be the source of a major potential misfit between human physiology 
and modern social institutions. (p. 97) 
An additional upside of the regeneration that can accompany representation is provided by Fromm 
(1941/1965) who, as noted above, found a downside of participation in the frantic, meaningless 
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activity arising from feelings of powerlessness and hopelessness. It may be that an upside of 
regenerative representation, to the extent it allows workers to effectively participate in decision-
making (which, as reported by Karasek and Theorell, 1990, can dramatically increase their power and 
self-esteem), may contribute to the development of the workers’ self-confidence, a condition that 
Fromm believes can contribute to workers embracing their freedom and realizing their human 
potential. 
Also, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) lends support to the idea that 
regeneration is a human right. Article 24 states: AEveryone has the right to rest and leisure, including 
reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay@ (p. 5). Thus, to the extent that 
representation is necessary to allow the regeneration of participatory inclinations, representation itself 
may be seen as a human right.  
Representation as Legitimation 
Representation can provide the rules and structure to ensure that everyone’s voice can be heard 
and considered. Absent formal representative fora, Young (2002) reminds us that it is not always the 
wisest but often the loudest voice that dominates. Thus, Pitkin (1971) describes representation as 
including both authorization and accountability. 
In this sense, representation can, as Young (2002) tells us, address the Acomplex realities of 
democratic process...the web of modern social life [that] ties the action of some people and institutions 
in one place to consequences in many other places and institutions.@ (p. 124). Absent this upside of 
representation, democratic practice that relied only on face-to-face participation would be unthinkable 
for any activity of broad scale. 
Further, Young (2002) notes that representation, if effectively structured, can ensure that 
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marginalized racial minority groups and/or classes can be assured of the representation that they may 
be denied through the exertion of power by privileged elites. These structural upsides of representation 
can be achieved through such means as providing Aquotas for women in party lists@ (p. 150) or 
Aproportional representation@ (p. 152). 
Representation and the Workplace 
For Melman (2001) representation (in the form of unions) is the essential ingredient for workplace 
democracy. In the workplace, representation could; a) overcome the downsides of participation such as 
exhaustion and the resultant apathy; b) provide workers with increased abilities to participate in worker 
control of decision making; c) contribute to the workers’ capacity for learning and growth (this is 
especially important as a polarity management tool to enhance the quality of participation beyond the 
level feared by Schumpeter); d) contribute to the self-confidence and self esteem of workers; and e) 
contribute to the capacity of workers to embrace commitments to the organization and the community. 
The Downsides of Representation 
A significant downside of representation is that it may allow the representative to develop 
increasingly weak relationships with the represented. The more alienated a representative becomes 
from the represented, the less likely the representation will be effective. When this happens, it detracts 
from the concept of representation as legitimation.  
In addition, in contrast to the potential upside of inclusion for marginalized groups, it is possible 
that the opposite situation may occur. Representative forms of governance may reproduce the 
marginalization of groups, and foster an imposition of elite beliefs and decisions on the body politic, 
whether societal or workplace. 
In all of these instances, these downsides of representation may lead to a further downside, the 
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lack of participation. Young (2002) tells us AWhen representatives become too separated, constituents 
lose the sense that they have influence over policy-making, become disaffected, and withdraw their 
participation@ (p. 132). 
Having explored the upsides and downsides of participation and representation, I now explore the 
extent of their polarity relationship. I do so by moving to Section 2, where I use the questions that I 
drew from Johnson (1996) in Chapter 2 to examine a) whether or not a polarity relationship exists, and 
b) if so, the extent to which the polarity conforms to the expectations of Johnson’s model.  
Section 2. The Polarity Relationship of Participation and Representation 
Analysis of Participation and Representation 
in Relation to the Polarity Management Concept 
 
To analyze the polarity relationship of participation and representation, I now turn to the questions 
drawn from Johnson (1996) in Chapter 2 to examine: a) whether or not a polarity relationship exists; 
and b) if so, the extent to which the polarity conforms to the expectations of Johnson’s model.  
1. Johnson (1996) asks “is the difficulty ongoing?” (p. 81). Yes. The question of how much 
participation is appropriate, particularly from the standpoint of how much participation a person can 
engage in without becoming exhausted, overwhelmed, or apathetic, is not one that can be answered on 
a universal basis. Each individual possesses varying capacities for participation, and however strong 
those varying capacities might be, there will always be a need for some process to provide legitimate 
representation for the individual when the individuals capacity for participation is exceeded. 
2. Johnson (1996) asks “are there two poles which are interdependent?” (p. 81). Yes. Participation 
absent representation may become overwhelming and thus devolve to apathy. Or, it can lead to the 
type of frenzied activity described by Fromm (1941/1965). Or, it can degenerate into the kind of mass 
hysteria feared by Schumpeter (1943). As for representation, because it is primarily a polarity of 
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function, it is necessary as a means to both enable participation by the individual at the highest level 
possible, while ensuring that the interests of the individual are represented when it is impossible for the 
individual to directly participate. However, there certainly are downsides to representative activities 
that could serve as the regenerative polarity of function for participation, but fail to serve in that 
function because of the absence of participation. For example, without participation as the polarity to 
representation, relaxation activities that might otherwise bring about regeneration can easily slip into 
apathy. Consistent with this observation, Bernstein (1976) has found that when participation is lacking 
in the workplace, you wind up with apathetic workers. Apathy is one of the downsides of 
representation (when it fails to perform as a polarity of function for participation). In this case, apathy 
(a potential downside of representation) is related to the absence of participation (in effect, the opposite 
of the upside of participation which is more inclined to generate commitment). Thus, apathy can arise 
from too much participation absent representation, or from activities that could be regenerative but are 
not because of the lack of participation. In fact, participation itself can be regenerative if is particularly 
successful (and for some individuals, even unsuccessful participation only serves to regenerate their 
activities). Particularly because they are primarily polarities of function, neither participation nor 
representation (or at least representation activities that could be regenerative and/or that also provide 
legitimate representation for the interests of the individual when direct participation is not possible) 
works well without the other.  
3. Johnson (1996) details three generic polarities (part and whole, self and other, doing and being). 
Is the polarity consistent with one of Johnson’s generic polarities? Yes. In this case participation and 
representation are primarily a doing-being polarity. Participation is the ideal and representation should 
be the process through which continued participation is possible, while also providing legitimate 
 266 
 
representation for the individual when direct participation is not possible. However, as noted above, 
sometimes participation and representation also are a polarity of meaning, as when representation 
allows for forms of regeneration that include non-participative relaxation or disengagement that 
restores or increases the ability of the worker to engage in further participation. 
4. When a polarity exists (as opposed to a solution to be found), Johnson (1996) visualizes his 
model of polarities as embracing four quadrants with each pole having upsides and downsides. Are 
there upsides and downsides? Yes. This chapter has specified upsides and downsides of participation 
and representation. But, if the results of representation actually serve to isolate the individual, (such as 
through non-participative relaxation or disengagement) then it is possible that representation may lead 
to apathy. Further, a potential downside of representation may be the loss of the interests of the 
individual. 
5. Johnson (1996) says “the ongoing goal in Polarity Management is to stay in the upper two 
quadrants as much as possible” (p. 81). Is the goal of this polarity to stay in the upper two quadrants? 
Yes. The downsides of participation (e.g., exhaustion, apathy) should be avoided and it is through the 
upsides of representation that this can occur. Also, the failure to maintain the upsides of representation 
may limit the ability to maintain the upsides of participation. 
6. Johnson (1996) says “the clearest opposites...are the downside of one pole and the upside of the 
other” (p. 9). Are these the clearest opposites? Yes. Once again, if the downsides of participation 
include exhaustion and apathy, then the upsides of representation are clearly the opposite. Also, the 
downsides of representation (whether when representation leads to disengagement and apathy or when 
it fails to represent the interests of the individual represented) are specifically opposite to the upsides of 
participation. 
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7. Johnson (1996) says: Whenever there is a push for a shift from one pole of a polarity to the 
other, it is because those pushing are: 1) Experiencing or anticipating the downsides of the present pole 
which they identify as the ‘problem,’ and, 2) they are attracted to the upsides of the other pole which 
they identify as the ‘solution.’  (p. 7)  
Is this occurring? Not exactly. In the US the greatest push against participation has come from 
those who have perceived its downsides but nevertheless have not embraced the upsides of 
representation. Rather, they have chosen to argue against inclusion of participation within the concept 
of democracy and have embraced a concept of representation that is limited to the already privileged.  
8. Johnson (1996) believes these crusader and tradition-bearing forces both support the positive 
aspects of the pole they are espousing and fear the negative aspects of the opposite pole. Is this 
occurring? No. Those who oppose participation generally do not espouse the upsides of representation. 
Rather they embrace the downsides of representation, limiting representation to the already privileged. 
9. When polarities are not recognized and managed, Johnson (1996) maintains that there is a 
natural pattern of shifting from one polarity to the other. Eventually (assuming power imbalances do 
not prevent it), he indicates that the downsides of the present pole will prove too much, and the 
crusaders will be successful in shifting to the opposite pole. The process will then repeat itself, moving 
back and forth from one pole to the other and moving from the positive quadrants to the negative 
quadrants in an infinity loop configuration. Under these circumstances we never experience the upsides 
of both poles simultaneously. Is this occurring? Yes. In the US in particular, the waxing and waning of 
support for participation appears to be generated by power differentials (opposition to participation on 
the part of those who have the power) rather than by seeking the true upsides of representation. This 
situation also is related to the fact that participation and representation are primarily polarities of 
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function, and only secondarily polarities of meaning.  
10. In the case where an organization or society concentrates on only one pole (such as the case 
where there is an overwhelming power imbalance in favor of either the crusaders or tradition-bearers) 
Johnson (1996) contends that the upside of that pole is lost and the negative aspects of the pole being 
focused on will become stronger (i.e., more time will be spent in the downside quadrant of that pole). 
He says: “Over-emphasize one pole for a long time and you get the downside of both poles. Further, 
you also tend to lose the benefits [upper quadrants] of both the over emphasized pole and the neglected 
pole” (p. 156). Is this occurring? Yes. Since the opponents of participation do so not because they 
espouse legitimate representation but because they seek to deny power to others through limiting their 
participation, the result is consistent. Lack of participation leads to the powerlessness and apathy that 
make a person less able or even willing to seek further opportunities for participation.  
11. Johnson (1996) believes “There are two major factors which reduce the crusader’s ability to 
see the whole dilemma” (p. 256). He presents the first factor as: 
DURATION:  
The longer an individual or group experiences one of the lower quadrants, the more attractive 
becomes the upper quadrant of the opposite pole and the more difficult it is to see any upside to 
the present pole or any downside to the other pole. (p. 256) 
Is this occurring? No. For those who have been denied participation (and this applies to most 
workers over the centuries) the opposite is more likely to be true. They are less likely to see the upsides 
of representation. As for those who overcome this inertia and do see the need for representation, they 
nevertheless generally remain committed primarily to the upsides of participation. 
12. The second major factor that Johnson (1996) believes will “reduce the crusader’s ability to see 
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the whole dilemma” (p. 256) is intensity. He presents this as: 
INTENSITY 
The more intense the negative experience in a particular lower quadrant, the more powerful is 
the crusade to the upside of the opposite pole. Consistent with that, the greater the intensity, the 
more difficult it is to see the upside of the present pole and the downside of the “ideal” place to 
which one wants to go. When you combine long duration with a high intensity of suffering, the 
ability to see all four quadrants is radically impaired. (p. 256)   
Is this occurring? Yes. Again, because participation and representation are primarily polarities of 
function rather than polarities of meaning, those who are crusaders for participation tend not to be 
crusaders for representation, while those who oppose general participation by the most dispossessed, 
generally ignore the concept of representation as serving the interests of those who they seek to deny 
participation.  
13. Johnson (1996) believes “there are two major factors which reduce the tradition-bearer’s 
ability to see the whole dilemma” (p. 258). He presents the first factor as: 
INSULATION  
Those who benefit most from the upside of a particular pole tend to fall out of touch with those 
who benefit least and suffer most from the downside of the same pole. The greater the relative 
benefits a person or group has from the upside of a pole, the more they will insulate themselves 
from downside realities. (p. 258)   
Is this occurring? Yes. Those who benefit most from a lack of worker participation generally have 
the upsides of participation for themselves. They certainly have fallen out of touch with those who (by 
being denied opportunities for participation) benefit the least. Further, they are insulated from the day-
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to-day reality of those who are denied opportunities for participation. Also, particularly in the US, 
those who benefit from national representation that excludes the interests of the poor have pursued 
policies that would further restrict the ability of the poor to participate even in the selection of 
representatives. 
14. The second major factor that Johnson (1996) believes will “reduce the tradition-bearer’s ability 
to see the whole dilemma” (p. 258) is anticipated loss. He defines this as: 
ANTICIPATED LOSS  
The greater the anticipated loss from getting caught in the downside of the opposite pole, the 
more difficult it will be to see the upside of that opposite pole. The combination of insulation 
and anticipated loss make it very difficult for tradition-bearers to see the whole polarity. (p. 
258)  
Is this occurring? Yes. Those who have the power to deny worker participation certainly have lost 
sight of the upsides of either pole as it applies to workers. However, they do not seem to have any 
difficulty seeing the upsides of participation and representation for themselves. Particularly in the US, 
this blindness has now extended to the societal realm, where those in power represent the interests of 
the privileged class and seek to further deny participation to the already disenfranchised because the 
fear that there will be a more equitable sharing of wealth. 
Based on the above analysis, my conclusion is that participation and representation meet the 
fundamental criteria for polarities as specified by Johnson (1996). They represent a difficulty that is 
ongoing and there are two poles that are interdependent. On one hand, there is a difficulty maintaining 
participation at the required level absent some form of representation. On the other hand, 
representation that could be regenerative can instead lead to apathy absent either the opportunity for 
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participation or representation that serves only the interests of the most powerful. While participation 
and representation do not fully conform with the 12 traits anticipated by Johnson, there is enough 
conformity that, when combined with the fact that they meet the two fundamental criteria, it is clear 
that they are a polarity. 
The Interrelationships of Participation and Representation 
With The Other Elements of The Polarities of Democracy Model 
 
Rousseau (1983) linked participation with the concept of equality, establishing the essential level 
of participation as the ownership of property, in order to ensure that each individual has the resources 
to be able to act independently without being subject to the coercion of those with greater resources. 
While Rousseau’s advocacy of equality was not absolute, even his stress on relative equality seems 
incomprehensible when viewed against the vast inequalities in wealth and power that characterize our 
modern world. Yet, as I have explored in other chapters, there are solutions to inequality that can be 
pursued through the participation (human agency) of adult educators and of others who seek to 
advance democratic concepts. This linkage of participation and equality is also evidenced in the 
writing of Cole (1920) and Pateman (1970). 
Pateman (1970) tells us that Rousseau also linked participation with issues of freedom and control 
and that Athe more fanciful and sinister interpretations that have been placed on@ (p. 25) Rousseau’s 
Amost...notorious@ statement concerning forcing people to be free Awould not have been possible if 
Rousseau’s concept of freedom had been placed firmly in the context of participation.@  Pateman goes 
on to explain that for Rousseau, Athe way in which an individual can be ‘forced’ to be free is part and 
parcel of the same process by which he is ‘forcibly’ educated through participating in decision 
making.@    
As noted above, Karasek and Theorell (1990) suggest that participation in workplace decision-
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making may increase worker self-confidence and self-esteem. These are human characteristics that 
Fromm (1941/1965) found to be necessary to combat our Afear of freedom@ (p. xii). Thus, opportunities 
for participation in workplace decision-making may contribute to our ability to embrace true freedom. 
Bernstein (1976) has found that democratization of the workplace includes a feedback loop 
between participation and the economic rewards provided to workers. Thus, there is an 
interrelationship between participation and the diversity-equality polarity. 
Shapiro (1999) finds an interrelationship between participation and justice. He states: 
Aparticipation plays a necessary but circumscribed role in ordering social relations justly. Valuable as 
democratic participation is in managing the power dimensions of collective activities, it is not the point 
of the exercise@ (p. 23). 
Shapiro also notes the interrelationship of participation and equality. He argues that corporate 
power, when allowed to participate unchecked in the democratic process, results in a decision-making 
process that is skewed in favor of corporate wealth and not necessarily in the interest of people. 
Poole (1975) points out the interrelationship between participation and equality. He states that it is 
necessary for workers to have equal access to the information possessed by managers, in order to 
participate effectively in the decision-making process. 
As noted in Section 1 above, Schweickart (2002) identified four factors that would enhance the 
ability of worker participation in decision-making to increase productivity: profit sharing, guaranteed 
long-range employment, relatively narrow wage differentials, and guaranteed worker rights. Thus, he 
has directly linked participation, justice, equality, and human rights, each of which are elements 
contained within the Polarities of Democracy. 
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Conclusion to Chapter 7 
 
In this chapter I have explored the relationship of participation and representation. I have 
shown the importance of participation to the concept of workplace (and societal) democracy. I 
have identified representation as a polarity of both function and meaning for participation, 
particularly to avoid burnout and apathy. I have identified upsides and downsides of both 
participation and representation and suggested that the upsides of each benefit individual 
workers, the organization, and the community. I have asserted that upsides of both participation 
and representation are necessary for both workplace and societal democracy. I have examined 
the interdependence of participation and representation, and their consistency with the Polarity 
Management concept. Finally, I have shown the complex interrelatedness of the participation and 
representation polarity with the other polarity elements contained within the Polarities of 
Democracy. This concludes my examination of the five pairs of polarities in the Polarities of 
Democracy model. In the next chapter I draw my conclusions regarding the utility of the 
Polarities of Democracy. 
 
